About this recording
529–14
- President Richard M. Nixon
- Henry A. Kissinger
- Alexander P. Butterfield
- Mark Andrews
June 27, 1971
Conversation No. 529-14
Date: June 27, 1971
Time: 8:18 pm - 9:14 pm
Location: Oval Office
10
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/08)
The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.
Kissinger’s trip to Paris
Alexander P. Butterfield entered at an unknown time after 8:18 pm.
Item for President
Conv. No. 529-14 (cont.)
Butterfield left at an unknown time before 9:14 pm.
Vietnam peace negotiations
-Kissinger’s trip to Paris
-Le Duc Tho
-Xuan Thuy demeanor
-Set up of negotiating area
-Discussion of US proposals
-Le Duc Tho speech
-Consequences of failure
-North Vietnamese questions
-Kissinger’s response
-North Vietnamese counter proposals
-Precedent
-Significance
-Details
-US withdrawal
-Time frame
-Prisoners of war [POW] release
-Time frame
-Political settlement
-Nguyen Van Thieu
-Nguyen Cao Ky
-Political settlement
-US response
-Letter from President
-Details
-Laos and Cambodia Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962
-Disposition
-Indochinese future
-Signing of agreement
-International guarantees and supervision of ceasefire
-Significance of counter proposals
-Possible overthrow of Thieu, Ky and [Duong Van Minh ?]
11
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/08)
-Next meeting
-US changes in proposals
-Focus on South Vietnamese government
-Kissinger’s questions on North Vietnam counter proposal
-Possible Thieu, Ky and Minh overthrow
-South Vietnam acceptance of North Vietnam terms
-Assurances
-Coalition government Conv. No. 529-14 (cont.)
-International supervision
-Thieu and Ky status
-Next meeting
-Danger of leaks
-Consequences
-North Vietnam counter proposal
-POWs
-US leaks
-Benefits
-Kissinger and David K.E. Bruce conversation
-Chance for progress on China
-Briefing of Bruce by Vernon A. Walters
-Timing
-Prior breakthrough
-Significance of proposal
-Future negotiations
-Next meting
-Secrecy
-Timing
-Bruce
-William P. Rogers
-Bruce and Rogers role
-Further information
-Kissinger’s conversation with Bruce
Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 8:18 pm.
Refreshments
Sanchez left at an unknown time before 9:14 pm.
People’s Republic of China [PRC] negotiations
-Significance
-Kissinger’s conversation with Bruce
12
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/08)
-Revelation of PRC contacts
-Secrecy
-Rogers
-Discussion of PRC contacts with others
-Bruce
Soviet Union summit
-Possibilities Conv. No. 529-14 (cont.)
Vietnam negotiations
-History of Soviet involvement
-Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
-Le Duc Tho's role
-Earlier proposals
-Japanese parallel
-Significance of Laos
-Reports
-I Corp Area
-Past involvement
-Possible impact
-PRC
-Thieu
-House and Senate
-Mansfield resolution
-Pentagon Papers
-Totality of story
-North Vietnam intentions
-US options
-Kissinger's trip to San Clemente
-Thieu's response
-US options
-East German report
-Cambodia
-PRC
-North Vietnam activities
-PRC announcement
-Timing
-Alexander M. Haig Jr.
-Related to Soviet Summit announcement
-US support for Thieu
-Ky
-Critique of President's policy
13
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/08)
-Lyndon B. Johnson’s reaction
Pentagon Papers
-British Press Regarding Pentagon Papers
-Roy H. Thompson lunch
-John Freeman
British government Conv. No. 529-14 (cont.)
-Edward R.G. Heath
-Regards to the President
-Demeanor in adversity
-Reaction to Pentagon Papers
-Effect on domestic politics
-Official secrets act
-Need for secrecy in diplomacy
Pentagon Papers
-Supreme Court action by President
-Effects
-Democratic Party
-Effects
-Hubert H. Humphrey
-Humphrey and Johnson relationship
-Edmund S. Muskie
-Edward M. (“Ted”) Kennedy
-Eventual result
-Johnson
-John F. Kennedy
-Kissinger's comments to British press
-President's reaction
-Integrity of government
-Justice
-Freeman’s comments
-President’s morality
-President’s religious background
-[Unintelligible name]
Vietnam Peace Negotiations
-Thieu’s fate
-Impact of US Congressional action
-Survival potential
-Pentagon role
14
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/08)
-Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
-Bombing
-Bruce
-Political implications
-Nature of agreement
-Ceasefire
-POWs
-Compromise of US and North Vietnam proposals Conv. No. 529-14 (cont.)
-Withdrawal offer
-Date
-POWs
-Thieu and Ky
-Thieu election strategy
-Relationship to US presence
-US role
-Cambodia
-Laos
-Bombing of harbors
-Size of US Army in Asia
-Compared to PRC Army
-Future US role
-US position
-Need for withdrawal
-Role of bombing
-Role of bombing
-Effect of Senate actions
-Mansfield Amendment
-Kissinger’s talk to Hugh Scott
-Gerald R. Ford
-John C. Stennis
-US meetings with PRC and Soviet Union
-Kissinger’s conversation with Chou En-lai
-PRC influence
-Further Kissinger and President Contacts
-Help for Kissinger
-Haig
-Security leaks
-Winston Lord
-Impact of announcement of PRC trip
PRC
-Announcement of President's trip
15
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/08)
-Timing
-Impact
-Effect on Paris talks
-Contact with Soviet Union
-Bruce's mission
-Kissinger trip to San Clemente
-Informing William P. Rogers
-Other travels Conv. No. 529-14 (cont.)
-Camouflage for PRC trip
-Prevention of leaks
-Dobrynin's contacts with Kissinger and Rogers
-Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
-Mutual and Balances Force Reduction [MBFR]
-Bruce
-Rogers and Congressional committees
-Dean Rusk
Foreign Policy initiatives
-Announcements
-President's visit to PRC
-Bruce's mission
-Soviet move
-Presidential visit to the Soviet Union
-Timing
-[Richard A. Moore ?]
Vietnam negotiations
-Support for Thieu
-Effect of other as President
-Humphrey
-Muskie
-Edward Kennedy
-Need to prevent Communist takeover
-Risk of settlement
-Communist takeover
-Timing
-Effect on US policy
-POWs
-Congressional pressure
-Length
-Effect of PRC announcement
-North Vietnamese flexibility
16
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/08)
-Soviet Pressure
-Berlin talks
-D. Kenneth Rush
-Dobrynin
-SALT
-North Vietnamese flexibility
PRC initiative Conv. No. 529-14 (cont.)
-PRC cooperation
-Possible price
-Taiwan
-US support
-Announcement
-Timing
-Coverage
-Impact of PRC and US talks
-Substance
-Nature of US and PRC relations
-Taiwan
-Japanese and US long term relationship
-Expansion
-Reasons
-PRC expansion
-Reasons
-PRC image in other Asian nations
-Thailand
-Burma
-Indonesia
-Philippines
-US and PRC detente
-Impact on Asia
-Balance of power
-Soviet desire for summit
-Timing of summits
-Soviet Union compared with PRC
-Bruce
-Rogers
-Middle East negotiations
-Kissinger’s view
-Conduct of negotiations
-Bruce
-Bruce's ability
17
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/08)
-Rejection of publicity
-Use of Two-man team
-Soviet Union
-PRC
General foreign policy performance
-Melvin R. Laird
-Rogers Conv. No. 529-14 (cont.)
-President's role in history
-Kissinger’s view
-Letter to Kissinger from Harvard \"dove\"
Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 8:18 pm.
President's schedule
Sanchez left at an unknown time before 9:14 pm.
The President and Kissinger left at 9:14 pm.
Date: June 27, 1971
Time: 8:18 pm - 9:14 pm
Location: Oval Office
10
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/08)
The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.
Kissinger’s trip to Paris
Alexander P. Butterfield entered at an unknown time after 8:18 pm.
Item for President
Conv. No. 529-14 (cont.)
Butterfield left at an unknown time before 9:14 pm.
Vietnam peace negotiations
-Kissinger’s trip to Paris
-Le Duc Tho
-Xuan Thuy demeanor
-Set up of negotiating area
-Discussion of US proposals
-Le Duc Tho speech
-Consequences of failure
-North Vietnamese questions
-Kissinger’s response
-North Vietnamese counter proposals
-Precedent
-Significance
-Details
-US withdrawal
-Time frame
-Prisoners of war [POW] release
-Time frame
-Political settlement
-Nguyen Van Thieu
-Nguyen Cao Ky
-Political settlement
-US response
-Letter from President
-Details
-Laos and Cambodia Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962
-Disposition
-Indochinese future
-Signing of agreement
-International guarantees and supervision of ceasefire
-Significance of counter proposals
-Possible overthrow of Thieu, Ky and [Duong Van Minh ?]
11
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/08)
-Next meeting
-US changes in proposals
-Focus on South Vietnamese government
-Kissinger’s questions on North Vietnam counter proposal
-Possible Thieu, Ky and Minh overthrow
-South Vietnam acceptance of North Vietnam terms
-Assurances
-Coalition government Conv. No. 529-14 (cont.)
-International supervision
-Thieu and Ky status
-Next meeting
-Danger of leaks
-Consequences
-North Vietnam counter proposal
-POWs
-US leaks
-Benefits
-Kissinger and David K.E. Bruce conversation
-Chance for progress on China
-Briefing of Bruce by Vernon A. Walters
-Timing
-Prior breakthrough
-Significance of proposal
-Future negotiations
-Next meting
-Secrecy
-Timing
-Bruce
-William P. Rogers
-Bruce and Rogers role
-Further information
-Kissinger’s conversation with Bruce
Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 8:18 pm.
Refreshments
Sanchez left at an unknown time before 9:14 pm.
People’s Republic of China [PRC] negotiations
-Significance
-Kissinger’s conversation with Bruce
12
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/08)
-Revelation of PRC contacts
-Secrecy
-Rogers
-Discussion of PRC contacts with others
-Bruce
Soviet Union summit
-Possibilities Conv. No. 529-14 (cont.)
Vietnam negotiations
-History of Soviet involvement
-Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
-Le Duc Tho's role
-Earlier proposals
-Japanese parallel
-Significance of Laos
-Reports
-I Corp Area
-Past involvement
-Possible impact
-PRC
-Thieu
-House and Senate
-Mansfield resolution
-Pentagon Papers
-Totality of story
-North Vietnam intentions
-US options
-Kissinger's trip to San Clemente
-Thieu's response
-US options
-East German report
-Cambodia
-PRC
-North Vietnam activities
-PRC announcement
-Timing
-Alexander M. Haig Jr.
-Related to Soviet Summit announcement
-US support for Thieu
-Ky
-Critique of President's policy
13
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/08)
-Lyndon B. Johnson’s reaction
Pentagon Papers
-British Press Regarding Pentagon Papers
-Roy H. Thompson lunch
-John Freeman
British government Conv. No. 529-14 (cont.)
-Edward R.G. Heath
-Regards to the President
-Demeanor in adversity
-Reaction to Pentagon Papers
-Effect on domestic politics
-Official secrets act
-Need for secrecy in diplomacy
Pentagon Papers
-Supreme Court action by President
-Effects
-Democratic Party
-Effects
-Hubert H. Humphrey
-Humphrey and Johnson relationship
-Edmund S. Muskie
-Edward M. (“Ted”) Kennedy
-Eventual result
-Johnson
-John F. Kennedy
-Kissinger's comments to British press
-President's reaction
-Integrity of government
-Justice
-Freeman’s comments
-President’s morality
-President’s religious background
-[Unintelligible name]
Vietnam Peace Negotiations
-Thieu’s fate
-Impact of US Congressional action
-Survival potential
-Pentagon role
14
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/08)
-Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
-Bombing
-Bruce
-Political implications
-Nature of agreement
-Ceasefire
-POWs
-Compromise of US and North Vietnam proposals Conv. No. 529-14 (cont.)
-Withdrawal offer
-Date
-POWs
-Thieu and Ky
-Thieu election strategy
-Relationship to US presence
-US role
-Cambodia
-Laos
-Bombing of harbors
-Size of US Army in Asia
-Compared to PRC Army
-Future US role
-US position
-Need for withdrawal
-Role of bombing
-Role of bombing
-Effect of Senate actions
-Mansfield Amendment
-Kissinger’s talk to Hugh Scott
-Gerald R. Ford
-John C. Stennis
-US meetings with PRC and Soviet Union
-Kissinger’s conversation with Chou En-lai
-PRC influence
-Further Kissinger and President Contacts
-Help for Kissinger
-Haig
-Security leaks
-Winston Lord
-Impact of announcement of PRC trip
PRC
-Announcement of President's trip
15
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/08)
-Timing
-Impact
-Effect on Paris talks
-Contact with Soviet Union
-Bruce's mission
-Kissinger trip to San Clemente
-Informing William P. Rogers
-Other travels Conv. No. 529-14 (cont.)
-Camouflage for PRC trip
-Prevention of leaks
-Dobrynin's contacts with Kissinger and Rogers
-Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
-Mutual and Balances Force Reduction [MBFR]
-Bruce
-Rogers and Congressional committees
-Dean Rusk
Foreign Policy initiatives
-Announcements
-President's visit to PRC
-Bruce's mission
-Soviet move
-Presidential visit to the Soviet Union
-Timing
-[Richard A. Moore ?]
Vietnam negotiations
-Support for Thieu
-Effect of other as President
-Humphrey
-Muskie
-Edward Kennedy
-Need to prevent Communist takeover
-Risk of settlement
-Communist takeover
-Timing
-Effect on US policy
-POWs
-Congressional pressure
-Length
-Effect of PRC announcement
-North Vietnamese flexibility
16
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/08)
-Soviet Pressure
-Berlin talks
-D. Kenneth Rush
-Dobrynin
-SALT
-North Vietnamese flexibility
PRC initiative Conv. No. 529-14 (cont.)
-PRC cooperation
-Possible price
-Taiwan
-US support
-Announcement
-Timing
-Coverage
-Impact of PRC and US talks
-Substance
-Nature of US and PRC relations
-Taiwan
-Japanese and US long term relationship
-Expansion
-Reasons
-PRC expansion
-Reasons
-PRC image in other Asian nations
-Thailand
-Burma
-Indonesia
-Philippines
-US and PRC detente
-Impact on Asia
-Balance of power
-Soviet desire for summit
-Timing of summits
-Soviet Union compared with PRC
-Bruce
-Rogers
-Middle East negotiations
-Kissinger’s view
-Conduct of negotiations
-Bruce
-Bruce's ability
17
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/08)
-Rejection of publicity
-Use of Two-man team
-Soviet Union
-PRC
General foreign policy performance
-Melvin R. Laird
-Rogers Conv. No. 529-14 (cont.)
-President's role in history
-Kissinger’s view
-Letter to Kissinger from Harvard \"dove\"
Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 8:18 pm.
President's schedule
Sanchez left at an unknown time before 9:14 pm.
The President and Kissinger left at 9:14 pm.
Secret White House Tapes |