701–14

Conversation No. 701-14

Date: April 4, 1972
Time: 12:13 pm - 1:15 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

Kissinger’s schedule
-Meeting

Vietnam
-Weather
-Naval gunfire
-Mining operations
-Kissinger’s previous conversation with Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
-Plans
-Preparations
-Philippines
-Richard M. Helms
-Information
-Reaction
-[David] Kenneth Rush
-Conversation with Kissinger
-Dated statement
-Review of requests for bombing authority
-Melvin R. Laird's approval
-Surface to Air missiles [SAMs]
-Air strikes
-Increase
-Marine planes
-Location
-Support personnel
-US Air Force [USAF]
-Marine Aircraft
-Marines compared to USAF
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-USAF pilots
-Aircraft
-Quality
-The President’s view
-Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
-Haig’s opinion
-Moorer
-Response to the President's orders
-The President's orders
-Politics
-US foreign policy
-Military's role and responsibilities
-Ground troops
-Moorer
-B-52s
-Increase
-F-4s
-Carriers
-Number
-Destroyers
-Number
-The President’s opinion
-Cruisers
-Naval gunfire
-Targets
-Dong Hoi airfield
-Logistics
-Lyndon B. Johnson
-Air strikes
-Weather
-Improvement
-Possible delays
-Moorer's plans
-Kissinger’s previous conversation with Moorer
-Authority
-18th parallel
-Extension
-48 hour strike
-US position
-Mining
-Impact
-Delays
-Impact
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-North Vietnamese offensive
-Challenge
-South Vietnamese strategy
-Retreat and consolidation
-The President’s theory
-Winston S. Churchill on World War I
-Comparisons to present situation
-Lt. Gen. Sir Hubert de la Poer Gough
-Allied victory
-German losses and victories
-Ypres
-Numbers
-British retreat
-Erich Ludendorff
-Churchill’s point
-Necessity
-Hue and Da Nang
-Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu
-Possible strategy
-Formation of line
-Exposure of North Vietnam
-Demilitarized Zone [DMZ]
-Impact on North Vietnam
-Compared to Laos
-Possible end to the war by year’s end
-Political impact
-Election
-Timing
-Democratic National Convention
-North Vietnamese Offensive
-Need for decisive defeat
-Break in weather
-Negotiations
-Probability before trip to Soviet Union

Announcement on Warsaw
-Notification of State Department and Warsaw
-Laird

The President talked with an unknown person at an unknown time between 12:13 and 12:25 pm.

[Conversation No. 701-14A]
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Message for Herbert G. Klein
-Message for Richard L. Wilson
-Announcement on Warsaw
-Delay
-Diplomatic channels

[End of telephone conversation]

US-Soviet Union relations
-Kissinger's meeting with Leonid I. Brezhnev
-Note to the President
-Purpose


Laird and John H. Chafee entered at 12:25 pm; the White House photographer was present at the
beginning of the meeting.

Greetings

Chafee
-Departure from administration

[Photograph session]

Seating

Cabinet officers
-Subcabinet officers
-Importance
-Gratitude for Chafee's work
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*****************************************************************
BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 7m 59s ]


END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2

*****************************************************************


Kissinger's departure
-Phone call

Kissinger left at 12:35 pm.


*****************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 5m 43s ]


END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3

*****************************************************************


Portsmouth Navy Yard
-Decision to keep open
-Described
-Norris Cotton
-Value
-Laird
-Cotton
-Uses

Henry A. Kissinger entered at 12:42 pm.



Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
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-Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles [SLBMs]
-Passage
-Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles [SLBMs]
-Naval vessels
-Submarines
-Technical problems
-Keel laying

Presidential gifts
-Money clip

Chafee
-Laird

1972 election
-Chafee
-Campaign practices

Chafee left at 12:44 pm.


*****************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 5
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 41s ]


END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 5

*****************************************************************

SALT
-SLBMs
-Laird's position
-US negotiating position
-Helsinki
-An agreement
-Undersea Long-Range Missile System [ULMS]
-Keel laying
-Limitations
-Appeal
-Powered by the State Department and Joint Chief of Staff [JCS]
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-Problems
-Public apprehensions
-Soviet Union
-Submarine agreement
-Political problems
-Development of facilities
-Soviet [Delta Class] submarines
-Missiles
-Range
-Number
-Facilities
-US facilities
-Limitations

Vietnam
-President’s instructions to Laird
-North Vietnamese offensive
-Stakes For US
-US withdrawal
-President’s view
-US defeat
-Consequences
-US foreign policy
-Presidency
-President’s awareness of situation
-US counteraction
-National Security Council [NSC]
-William P. Rogerts
-State Department
-Risks
-Election
-Necessity for strong action
-Air and naval power
-Increase
-The President's meeting with Adm. Thomas H. Moorer and [David]
Kenneth Rush
-Washington Special Actions Group [WSAG] reports
-Laird's Role
-Criticism
-Assessing success and failure
-Laird's recommendation
-Cancellation of bombing
-Target areas
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-Geographical limit
-US options
-Air strikes
-Laird’s recommendation
-18th parallel
-No restrictions on authority
-Timing
-Authority
-Extension
-Time frame
-US actions
-Resources
-Support role
-Target areas
-B-3 area
-Activity
-Weather
-Forecasts
-Timing
-USAF reluctance
-Battle of the Bulge
-Comparisons
-Risks
-Naval Gunfire
-Ships
-Number
-Guns
-Capacities
-Accuracy
-Shore batteries
-Destroyers
-Targets
-Tactical Air Support [TACAIR]
-Performance
-Tanks
-Personnel
-Sir Robert Thompson
-North Vietnamese vulnerability
-South Vietnam military
-Hue
-Thieu
-Retreat
-Advantages
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-Battle of Verdun
-French
-Reports of battle
-Criticism of Department of Defense [DoD]
-Bombing requests
-Possible problems coming from Laird’s office
-Blame on Laird for reluctance
-JCS
-Lack of forthcoming infromation to the President
-Air strikes
-Laird's role
-Loyalty to the President
-Possibly questioned
-Press conference
-Rogers
-Timing
-Demilitarized Zone [DMZ] violations
-Schedule changes
-Recognition of Bangladesh
-Rogers’s responsibilities
-Laird’s previous conversation with the President
-Previous telephone conversation with Robert J.
McCloskey
-Ronald L. Ziegler
-Line for the press
-Conversation with Laird’s people
-President’s instructions for Laird
-Points to make
-US purposes for air strikes
-Protection of Americans
-Vietnamization
-Continuation
-Aid to South Vietnam's defense
-Prisoners of War [POWs] return
-US actions
-Ground troops
-Air power
-Target areas
-Violation of international law
-Strong, hard line from Laird
-Rogers
-Comparison to Laird
-Cambodia
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-Changes in character of war
-Compared with Korean Conflict
-Violations by North Vietnam
-1954 agreement, 1968 bombing halt
-Rogers
-Air strikes
-Targets
-Protection of Americans
-Number
-Escalation of war
-Edmund S. Muskie's charges
-The President’s response
-Hubert H. Humphrey
-Demands for more aid to South Vietnam
-North Vietnamese offensive
-Vietnamization
-Impact
-Laird's statement
-Possible credibility problem
-South Vietnamese strength
-Chances of success
-Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
-Thieu
-US confidence in South Vietnamese
Abilities
-Abrams comment
-Football analogy
-Past retreats
-Battle of the Bulge
-World War I
-Great Britain and Germany
-Public relations response
-Laird's statements
-Follow-up from the President
-Timing
-Scheduling
-Rogers and Laird
-Coordination of various agencies
-Authorities
-Ziegler
-Report of meeting between Laird and the President
-Laird
-Loyalty to the President
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-Questions
-Laird's relationship with JCS
-Hardline from Laird

The President talked with an unknown person at an unknown time between 12:44 and 1:11 pm.

[Conversation No. 701-14B]

Request that Ziegler join them

[End of telephone conversation]

Vietnam
-North Vietnamese offensive
-Laird
-Loyalty to the President
-Problems of communication within the DoD and between the DoD
and the White House
-Weather
-Forecasts
-Effect on air sorties
-Number
-B-3 Area
-Possible psychological impact
-Effect on air sorties
-B-52s
-Problems
-Surface-To-Air Missiles [SAMs]
-Countermeasures
-Target Areas
-DMZ
-Effectiveness
-SAMs
-Target Areas
-Risks
-DMZ
-SAMs
-Losses
-Florida
-US countermeasures
-Options

Ziegler entered At 1:11 pm.
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-Impact on People’s Republic of China [PRC] and Soviet Union
-US credibility
-Impact on US allies
-Asia, Europe and Latin America

Kissinger left at 1:12 pm.

-The President's meeting with Laird
-Ziegler's report
-Statement for press
-Laird's press conference
-Timing
-Rogers
-Presentation

Laird left at an unknown time before 1:15 pm.

-Weather
-Impact on air strikes
-Public reaction
-Air strikes
-Muskie's criticism
-Escalation of war
-Responsibility
-North Vietnamese offensive
-McCloskey
-Ziegler's report
-Administation’s stance
-Ziegler’s previous conversation with Haig
-Public relations
-Strategy
-Comments to press
-Confidence
-Possible outcome
-Press
-Contradictory reports
-Robert Pierpoint
-Crisis in White House
-Ziegler’s previous conversatin with Bill Jarriel [?]
-WSAG meetings
-Templeton [first name unknown]
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Ziegler left at 1:15 pm.