About this recording
701–2
- President Richard M. Nixon
- Alexander P. Butterfield
- H. R. Haldeman
- Henry A. Kissinger
- White House operator
- Thomas H. Moorer
April 4, 1972
Conversation No. 701-2
Date: April 4, 1972
Time: 9:05 am - 9:43 am
Location: Oval Office
The President met with Alexander P. Butterfield.
The President's schedule
-Meeting with John H. Chafee
-Melvin R. Laird
-Timing
-The President’s previous talk with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
-Candidacy for Senate
The President talked with Haldeman at an unknown time between 9:05 and 9:08 am.
[Conversation no. 701-2A]
The President's meeting with Chafee
-Purpose
-Laird
-Gen. Brent G. Scowcroft
-Secretary of the Navy
-Candidacy for Senate
-Presence of others
-Laird
[End of telephone conversation]
2
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/06)
Henry A. Kissinger entered at 9:08 am.
The President's meeting with Chafee
-Laird's presence
-Purpose
Butterfield left at 9:09 am.
-Press conference
-Possible location
Vietnam
-Laird
-Criticism
-Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
-Laird's reaction
-Reports
-Meeting with the President
-Purpose
-Air strikes
-Authority
-Possible criticism
-Kissinger
-Moorer’s opinion
-Laird
-Weather
-Impact
-Number of sorties
-Damage
-Bridge
-Convoy
-Secondary explosions
-Tanks
-B-52s
-Increase
-Number
-From the US
-Naval Gunfire
-Increase
-North Vietnamese offensive
-US intentions
-Amount of preparation
- Soviet Union and People's Republic of China [PRC]
3
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/06)
-Possible impact on the upcoming election
-Blockade
-Preparation of the Navy
-President’s instructions
-Seriousness
-Slow nature of mining
-Blockade
-Selective nature
-Food and medical supplies
-Air strikes
-Weather
-Impact
-Months of activity
-Laird
-Department of State
-New ideas
-Upcoming meeting
-Public relations
-Demilitarized Zone [DMZ] crossing
-New York Times
-Characterization of invasion
-Impact
-Threefold US reaction
-Protection of US forces
-Withdrawal program
-South Vietnamese resistance
-White House, Defense and State Department statements
-Inadequacies
-Correction
-The President’s displeasure
-Sources
-Press coverage
-Statement by Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu
-New York Times coverage
-Quality
-News summary
-II Corps-B-3 area
-US actions
-Reports
-Answer to Kissinger’s question
-Moorer
-Gen. John A. Vogt, Jr.
-President’s instructions to Kissinger
4
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/06)
-Problems
-Surface to Air Missiles [SAMs]
-Press reports
-Public relations
-US actions
-Compared with Laos
-Low profile
-Laird's press conference
-Press reports
-Ronald L. Ziegler
-Atmosphere in White House
-Columbia Broadcasting System [CBS] story
-Source
-US foreign policy
-Soviet Union, PRC
-Impact of current offensive
-The President’s November 3, 1969 speech
-Cambodia
-North Vietnamese offensive
-Success
-Encouragement to domestic critics
-Nuclear weapons
-Blockade
-Soviet Reaction
-Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
-Soviets
-The President’s forthcoming trip
-Poland
-Dobrynin
-Message from Leonid I. Brezhnev
-North Vietnamese offensive
-US military
-Possible obstacle
5
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/06)
The President talked with the White House operator at an unknown time between 9:08 and 9:24
am.
[Conversation no. 701-2B]
[See Conversation no. 22-72]
[End of telephone conversation]
Vietnam
-North Vietnamese offensive
-US reaction
-Weather
-Naval gunfire
-Orders
-Cessation
-Location of targets
-Accuracy
-Bombing halt
-B-3 area
The president talked with Thomas H. Moorer between 9:24 and 9:28 am.
[Conversation No. 701-2C]
[See Conversation No. 22-73]
[End of telephone conversation]
Vietnam
-Kissinger's forthcoming contact with Ziegler
-Report
-Timing
-North Vietnamese offensive
-South Vietnamese countermeasures
-Dangers
-Quang Tri and Dong Ha
-Kissinger’s concern
-Retreat
-Effect on North Vietnamese supply lines
-Anticipated results
6
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/06)
-Hue
-Symbolism
-Retreat
-Counterattack
-Laos operation
-US Air Force [USAF]
-Third division
-Kissinger’s opinion
-Strength
-Concentration
-Effects of weather
-Crossing of river
-Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
-South Vietnamese retreats
-Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
-Trip to South Vietnam
-Possible options
-Laird's reaction
-Laird
*****************************************************************
BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
[Privacy]
[Duration: 3s]
END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
*****************************************************************
-Reaction to offensive
-North Vietnamese offensive
-US counterattack
-Restrictions on statements
-Scali
-Ziegler
-Massive invasion
-The President's Responsibilities
-Protecting human lives
-Ensuring withdrawal
7
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/06)
-South Vietnamese resistance
-Public Reaction
-Refugees
-Anticommunism
-Statements
-Rhetoric
-Scali and Ziegler
-President’s instructions to Kissinger
-Soviet Reactions
-Impact of US bombing
-Blockade
-Ships required
-Kissinger’s opinion
-Legality
-Mining
-Implementation
-Problems
-Compared with Cuban missile crisis
-Mines
-Delayed fuses
-Time allotted
-Selectivity
-Problems
-Food and medical supplies
-PRC
-Prisoners of War [POWs]
-Critics
-Edmund S. Muskie
-George S. McGovern
-Statements on escalation
-Muskie
-Kissinger’s view
-Charges of escalation
-US position
-Consequences of victory and defeat
-Reaction of the press
-Compared with Cambodian operation
-North Vietnamese offensive
-Impact on election
-The President’s view
-Impact on US foreign policy
-Communist powers
-Confidence in US
8
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/06)
-Support
-Europe and Asia
-Seven points
-Communists
-The President’s possible course of action in 1969
-Seriousness
-The President's policy
-Compared with Gen. Charles A. J. M. De Gaulle
-Resistance to defeat
-North Vietnamese Offensive
-Moorer’s location
-B-52s
-Attacks on North Vietnam
-Target areas
-DMZ
-Limits to target areas
-Possible escalation
-18th parallel
-Criticism
The President's meeting with Robert S. Ingersoll
-Instructions
-Kissinger's trip to Japan
-Length of meeting
-Meeting with Kissinger
Vietnam
-Air strikes
-Kissinger's trip to Japan
-Delay
-Decision
-Delays
-Possible duration
-Statements
-Scali
-Ziegler
Kissinger left at 9:43 am.
Date: April 4, 1972
Time: 9:05 am - 9:43 am
Location: Oval Office
The President met with Alexander P. Butterfield.
The President's schedule
-Meeting with John H. Chafee
-Melvin R. Laird
-Timing
-The President’s previous talk with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
-Candidacy for Senate
The President talked with Haldeman at an unknown time between 9:05 and 9:08 am.
[Conversation no. 701-2A]
The President's meeting with Chafee
-Purpose
-Laird
-Gen. Brent G. Scowcroft
-Secretary of the Navy
-Candidacy for Senate
-Presence of others
-Laird
[End of telephone conversation]
2
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/06)
Henry A. Kissinger entered at 9:08 am.
The President's meeting with Chafee
-Laird's presence
-Purpose
Butterfield left at 9:09 am.
-Press conference
-Possible location
Vietnam
-Laird
-Criticism
-Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
-Laird's reaction
-Reports
-Meeting with the President
-Purpose
-Air strikes
-Authority
-Possible criticism
-Kissinger
-Moorer’s opinion
-Laird
-Weather
-Impact
-Number of sorties
-Damage
-Bridge
-Convoy
-Secondary explosions
-Tanks
-B-52s
-Increase
-Number
-From the US
-Naval Gunfire
-Increase
-North Vietnamese offensive
-US intentions
-Amount of preparation
- Soviet Union and People's Republic of China [PRC]
3
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/06)
-Possible impact on the upcoming election
-Blockade
-Preparation of the Navy
-President’s instructions
-Seriousness
-Slow nature of mining
-Blockade
-Selective nature
-Food and medical supplies
-Air strikes
-Weather
-Impact
-Months of activity
-Laird
-Department of State
-New ideas
-Upcoming meeting
-Public relations
-Demilitarized Zone [DMZ] crossing
-New York Times
-Characterization of invasion
-Impact
-Threefold US reaction
-Protection of US forces
-Withdrawal program
-South Vietnamese resistance
-White House, Defense and State Department statements
-Inadequacies
-Correction
-The President’s displeasure
-Sources
-Press coverage
-Statement by Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu
-New York Times coverage
-Quality
-News summary
-II Corps-B-3 area
-US actions
-Reports
-Answer to Kissinger’s question
-Moorer
-Gen. John A. Vogt, Jr.
-President’s instructions to Kissinger
4
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/06)
-Problems
-Surface to Air Missiles [SAMs]
-Press reports
-Public relations
-US actions
-Compared with Laos
-Low profile
-Laird's press conference
-Press reports
-Ronald L. Ziegler
-Atmosphere in White House
-Columbia Broadcasting System [CBS] story
-Source
-US foreign policy
-Soviet Union, PRC
-Impact of current offensive
-The President’s November 3, 1969 speech
-Cambodia
-North Vietnamese offensive
-Success
-Encouragement to domestic critics
-Nuclear weapons
-Blockade
-Soviet Reaction
-Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
-Soviets
-The President’s forthcoming trip
-Poland
-Dobrynin
-Message from Leonid I. Brezhnev
-North Vietnamese offensive
-US military
-Possible obstacle
5
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/06)
The President talked with the White House operator at an unknown time between 9:08 and 9:24
am.
[Conversation no. 701-2B]
[See Conversation no. 22-72]
[End of telephone conversation]
Vietnam
-North Vietnamese offensive
-US reaction
-Weather
-Naval gunfire
-Orders
-Cessation
-Location of targets
-Accuracy
-Bombing halt
-B-3 area
The president talked with Thomas H. Moorer between 9:24 and 9:28 am.
[Conversation No. 701-2C]
[See Conversation No. 22-73]
[End of telephone conversation]
Vietnam
-Kissinger's forthcoming contact with Ziegler
-Report
-Timing
-North Vietnamese offensive
-South Vietnamese countermeasures
-Dangers
-Quang Tri and Dong Ha
-Kissinger’s concern
-Retreat
-Effect on North Vietnamese supply lines
-Anticipated results
6
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/06)
-Hue
-Symbolism
-Retreat
-Counterattack
-Laos operation
-US Air Force [USAF]
-Third division
-Kissinger’s opinion
-Strength
-Concentration
-Effects of weather
-Crossing of river
-Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
-South Vietnamese retreats
-Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
-Trip to South Vietnam
-Possible options
-Laird's reaction
-Laird
*****************************************************************
BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
[Privacy]
[Duration: 3s]
END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
*****************************************************************
-Reaction to offensive
-North Vietnamese offensive
-US counterattack
-Restrictions on statements
-Scali
-Ziegler
-Massive invasion
-The President's Responsibilities
-Protecting human lives
-Ensuring withdrawal
7
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/06)
-South Vietnamese resistance
-Public Reaction
-Refugees
-Anticommunism
-Statements
-Rhetoric
-Scali and Ziegler
-President’s instructions to Kissinger
-Soviet Reactions
-Impact of US bombing
-Blockade
-Ships required
-Kissinger’s opinion
-Legality
-Mining
-Implementation
-Problems
-Compared with Cuban missile crisis
-Mines
-Delayed fuses
-Time allotted
-Selectivity
-Problems
-Food and medical supplies
-PRC
-Prisoners of War [POWs]
-Critics
-Edmund S. Muskie
-George S. McGovern
-Statements on escalation
-Muskie
-Kissinger’s view
-Charges of escalation
-US position
-Consequences of victory and defeat
-Reaction of the press
-Compared with Cambodian operation
-North Vietnamese offensive
-Impact on election
-The President’s view
-Impact on US foreign policy
-Communist powers
-Confidence in US
8
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF
Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/06)
-Support
-Europe and Asia
-Seven points
-Communists
-The President’s possible course of action in 1969
-Seriousness
-The President's policy
-Compared with Gen. Charles A. J. M. De Gaulle
-Resistance to defeat
-North Vietnamese Offensive
-Moorer’s location
-B-52s
-Attacks on North Vietnam
-Target areas
-DMZ
-Limits to target areas
-Possible escalation
-18th parallel
-Criticism
The President's meeting with Robert S. Ingersoll
-Instructions
-Kissinger's trip to Japan
-Length of meeting
-Meeting with Kissinger
Vietnam
-Air strikes
-Kissinger's trip to Japan
-Delay
-Decision
-Delays
-Possible duration
-Statements
-Scali
-Ziegler
Kissinger left at 9:43 am.
Secret White House Tapes |