Secret White House Tapes

718–9

About this recording

718–9
  • President Richard M. Nixon
  • Henry A. Kissinger
  • Manolo Sanchez
May 3, 1972
Conversation No. 718-9

Date: May 3, 1972
Time: 10:59 am - 12:11 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

Kissinger's meeting

Vietnam
-North Vietnamese offensive
-Briefing on targets
-Melvin R. Laird's opinion
-Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
-[David] Kenneth Rush

Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 10:59 am.

Food order

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 12:11 pm

Vietnam
-North Vietnamese offensive
-Targets
-President's briefing
-Moorer
-Laird
-The President’s view
-Rush
-Value
-Compared with Laird

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
15

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 718-9 (cont.)

-Briefing
-Role of Laird and William P. Rogers
-Rush's position
-Information released
-Submarines
-Freeze
-Amount of detail
-Rogers's intentions
-Reasons
-Cabinet
-Role in talks

Vietnam
-South Vietnam
-Resupply mission
-Announcement
-Photographs of Soviet equipment
-Paris peace negotiations
-Possibilities
-Accept another meeting
-Walkout
-Postponement
-Kissinger’s view
-North Vietnamese offers
-US response
-Contents
-Nguyen Van Thieu
-Prisoners
-Public sessions
-Thieu
-Kissinger's prediction
-North Vietnam's options
-North Vietnam's goals
-North Vietnam proposals
-US reactions
-Private meetings
-Le Duc Tho
-Kissinger's view
-Bombing
-Importance
-US attitude
16

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 718-9 (cont.)

-Soviet interpretation
-North Vietnamese offensive
-Negotiations
-Plenary sessions
-William J. Porter
-Thieu's interpretation
-Plenary sessions
-President's options
-Laird's advice
-Thieu

SALT
-Rush
-View of Rogers and Laird
-Work with Rogers
-Berlin
-People's Republic Of China [PRC] communiqué
-News stories
-Rogers's role
-Objections
-Rogers
-Gerard C. Smith
-Support
-Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS]
-Secretary of Defense
-Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] Director
-Objections
-Rogers
-News stories
-Rogers's complaints
-Credit for agreement

Vietnam
-President's policies
-Credit
-North Vietnamese offensive
-Paris peace negotiations
-Walkout
-The President’s view
-Kissinger's trip to Moscow
-Porter and plenary session
17

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 718-9 (cont.)

-Editorial comment
Washington Star
-President's evaluation
-Possible walkout
-Soviet interpretation
-North Vietnam's interpretation
-US public opinion
-Support for walkout
-Criticism
-Senate Democratic caucus
-Position
-Robert C. Byrd
-Michael J. Mansfield Resolution
-George D. Aiken
-J. William Fulbright proposal
-Aiken’s view

Soviet Summit
-Cancellation
-US public opinion
-Impact of walkout on Vietnam negotiations
-President's approach
-Possible options
-Impact on Thieu
-Impact on Hanoi
-Impact on Soviets
-Initial impact
-Columnists
-Senators and Congressmen
-Concerns
-Suspicions
-Soviet response
-Further negotiations
-Impact of propaganda on public opinion in US and abroad
-Erosion over time
-Reasons
-Media attacks on President's foreign policy
-Soviet responsibility
-Impact on war's outcome
-Relation to new foreign policy
-PRC
18

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 718-9 (cont.)

-Soviet Union
-The President’s view
-Effects
-US public opinion
-Forthcoming Democratic convention
-Forthcoming election

Vietnam War
-Impact on forthcoming election
-Impact on war's outcome
-Importance
-Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
-Military failure
-Military-foreign policy of successor
-Soviet Summit
-Possible effects of cancellation on South Vietnam
-President’s evaluation
-Place on summit agenda
-Domestic impact
-US options
-Military action
-Effect on Soviet Summit
-US public support
-Effect on Soviet Union
-Effect on South Vietnam
-Effect on Soviet Union
-Effect on North Vietnam
-Perception
-Hue
-Importance
-Military action
-Effects

President's choices
-Cancellation of Summit compared with military action
-Risks
-Impact on war's outcome
-Kissinger's assessment
-Effects of cancellation
-Vietnam War
-Presidency
19

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 718-9 (cont.)

-President's place in history
-US role in the world
-President's trip to Moscow
-Risks
-US credibility with Soviet Union
-Allies' perception of US
-Soviet supplies to Vietnam
-Principles of coexistence
-Trade
-Middle East
-India-Pakistan War
-Southeast Asia
-Perception of President's policies
-Relationship to Vietnam War
-Peace
-Military victory
-Military defeat
-Hue
-A letter
-Possible Soviet responses
-Content
-Responses
-Cancellation of Summit
-Further military action

Press relations
-Response of liberals and press
-Impact on President and Kissinger
-Column by Hugh S. Sidey and James B. (“Scotty”) Reston
-William P. Rogers
-H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
-Kissinger's press briefings
-Portrayal by press
-Reasons
-Press
-Richard [Surname unknown]
-[Unknown person]
-Attacks by State Department
-Rogers
-Bernard Gwertzman
-New York Times article by Gwertzman
20

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 718-9 (cont.)

-Sources
-Rogers
-Haig
-Rogers
-Content
-Murray Marder article
-Rogers
-May 31, 1971 plan
-Kissinger's press contact
-Sidey
-Jerrold L. Schecter
-State Department press contact
-Time poll
-New York Times article by Gwertzman
-Richard F. Pedersen
-Robert J. McCloskey
-Kissinger's press contact
-Haldeman's views
-Pedersen
-Position at United Nations [UN]

Vietnam
-Military action
-Effect on Summit
-Possible cancellation
-President's speech
-Preparation
-Conclusions
-President's options
-Bombing Hanoi
-Kissinger draft
-Winston Lord
-John K. Andrews, Jr.
-Helmut Sonnenfeldt
-President's options
-Paris negotiations
-Walkout
-Timing
-Choices for US
-North Vietnamese offensive
-President's response
21

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 718-9 (cont.)

-Walkout
-North Vietnamese response
-Lyndon B. Johnson
-North Vietnamese proposals
-Contents
-US rejection
-US counterproposal
-US response
-Language
-Benefit of continuing negotiations
-Thieu
-Effect on further military action
-Effect on Soviet Summit
-May 4, 1972 meeting
-Issues
-Offensive
-Ceasefire
-Prisoners of war [POWs]
-Expected response
-Thieu
-Press freedom
-New York Times
-Military action
-Urgency
-Timing
-News coverage
-Soviet response
-Impact on Summit
-Military benefits
-Signal to Hanoi
-Message to Soviets
-Leonid I. Brezhnev's conversation with Gus Hall
-Possible cancellation of Summit
-President's visit to Moscow
-Timing with North Vietnamese offensive
-SALT agreement
-Common principles
-Possible signature
-Possible cancellation
-North Vietnamese offensive
-Weather
22

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 718-9 (cont.)

-Resupply of South Vietnam
-Haig
-Tanks
-Planes
-B-52s
-F-4s
-Message for Porter
-Wording
-Le Duc Tho
-President’s speech
-Wording
-President’s schedule
-Kissinger's forthcoming trip to Japan
-President’s summary
-Forthcoming election
-Need to avert defeat by Soviets


*****************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 1m 15s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3

*****************************************************************


Soviet Summit
-Risks of military action in Vietnam
-Ceasefire possibility
-Possible US response
-North Vietnam
-Hue

President's foreign policy
-Negotiating principles
-Trade, Middle East
-PRC
-Vietnam
23

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 718-9 (cont.)


Soviet Summit
-Danger of attending during North Vietnamese offensive
-Appearance of US weakness
-US cancellation
-Consequences for Vietnam
-Thieu's defeat
-The President’s view
-Effect of US military action
-Soviet cancellation of Summit
-Effect on peace talks
-The President’s meeting with Congressional leaders
-Effect on forthcoming election

South Vietnam
-Thieu
-Opposition
-Duong Van Minh's position
-Moorer
-US relations with Thieu
-Expendability
-North Vietnamese conditions

Soviet Summit
-Cancellation and military action
-Timing
-Advantages
-Disadvantages
-Relationship to military activities
-Hue
-Kontum
-Agreements with Soviets
-Benefits
-Health, science
-Brezhnev
-Risks
-Europe, PRC
-Value
-Forthcoming elections
-Response of allies
-Frank J. Shakespeare's assessment of détente
24

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 718-9 (cont.)

-Effect on President's prestige
-Link to Southeast Asia
-Importance of area
-Respect for President
-Cancellation
-Reasons
-Danger of attending during North Vietnamese offensive
-Nelson A. Rockfeller and Attica prison comparison

President's forthcoming speech
-Decision
-Timing
-Draft of speech
-Time of delivery
-Air strikes
-Arrangement with Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr. and Moorer
-Timing of possible Summit cancellation
-Draft of speech
-Effect on President's thinking
-Preparation
-Expected effects of speech
-Military action
-Timing
-Summit
-Cancellation
-Effect on military action
-Preparation of draft
-Timing of decision

Kissinger left at 12:11 pm.
Secret White House Tapes |

718–9

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