Before assuming the presidency, Jimmy Carter had been a one-term governor of a southern state with no national or international experience. He did, however, have his own foreign policy goals. Carter believed in the rule of law in international affairs and in the principle of self-determination for all people. Moreover, he wanted the United States to take the lead in promoting universal human rights. Carter believed that American power should be exercised sparingly and that the United States should avoid military interventions as much as possible. Finally, he hoped that American relations with the Soviet Union would continue to improve and that the two nations could come to economic and arms control agreements that would relax Cold War tensions.

During his campaign, Carter's aides claimed he would govern in a different way, specifically, that he would not appoint Washington insiders to top foreign policy positions. Once elected, however, Carter recognized that he needed experts around him to conduct his foreign policy. He named Columbia University professor Zbigniew Brzezinski as his national security adviser and former Defense Department official and Johnson administration diplomatic troubleshooter Cyrus Vance as secretary of state.

While Brzezinski and Vance both were experienced foreign policy hands, they had different strengths and worldviews. Brzezinski, an anti-communist Polish émigré who consistently advised a tough line towards the Soviet Union, served as the administration's foreign policy "idea man." Vance, on the other hand, had strong managerial skills and was known for his cautious and patient diplomacy. Brzezinski and Vance clashed throughout the Carter presidency over the tactics, strategies, and goals of the administration's foreign policy.

Human Rights

Carter came to the White House determined to make human rights considerations integral to US foreign policy. In part, this desire stemmed from practical politics: Carter's promises during the 1976 campaign that his administration would highlight human rights proved popular with the voting public. Just as important, Carter's emphasis on human rights was consistent with his own beliefs on the necessity of living one's life in a moral way.

What did Carter mean when he claimed that he would make human rights a key part of American foreign policy? Early in his presidency, Carter explained that US support for human rights involved promoting "human freedom" worldwide and protecting "the individual from the arbitrary power of the state." These principles grew out of the United Nation's 1948 "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," which established the foundation of the modern human rights movement. Carter believed in holding accountable America's allies as well as its adversaries for their human rights failings, an approach that risked straining relations with friends and widening existing rifts with foes. These were risks Carter was willing to take.

Carter’s strong commitment to human rights was connected to his personal experiences as a witness to the civil rights movement and the transformation of race relations in the American South. If Martin Luther King Jr.’s inspirational words and peaceful demonstrations could produce profound changes in the United States, an American president talking about human rights and making those rights a factor in foreign policy decisions might be able to achieve dramatic changes in countries across the world.

On that world stage, the Carter administration's human rights record was mixed. The president and his advisers denounced human rights violations by the Soviet Union and its East European allies. In addition, American allies such as South Korea also came under tough criticism for repressing democratic dissent. Moreover, the United States took tangible actions—including the suspension of military or economic aid—to protest the human rights practices of the governments of Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Uganda.

On the other hand, the Carter administration toned down its human-rights based criticisms of the Soviet Union after the Brezhnev government threatened to end arms control talks. Moreover, Carter refused to halt the sale of military supplies to Iran, whose government violently repressed its opponents, even though some of his advisers urged him to do so.

The legacies of Carter's human rights gambits were just as mixed as their practice. Carter, more than any previous president, injected human rights considerations into American foreign policy, legitimizing these concerns in the process. But conservative Republicans skillfully and successfully attacked Carter for supposedly undercutting American allies by criticizing their human rights' shortcomings. These attacks proved harmful to Carter during the 1980 election.

The Panama Canal

One of Carter's first challenges involved the US role in Panama. A 1904 treaty negotiated by President Theodore Roosevelt permitted the United States to use and occupy the Panama Canal Zone, a strip of land adjacent to the Panama Canal, which opened in 1914. In 1936, President Franklin Roosevelt, as part of the "good neighbor policy" had dropped the US claim to have the right to protect American lives and property in Panamanian cities. In 1964, after anti-American riots by Panamanian students, the United States and Panama agreed to negotiate on the future status of the zone. These negotiations were based on "eight principles" agreed to by Henry Kissinger in 1974, providing for Panamanian operation of the canal by 1999, and an end to US occupation of the zone, thereby establishing Panamanian sovereignty.

Carter approved the negotiation of two treaties with Panama—one that transferred the canal and the Canal Zone to Panama at the end of the century and one that guaranteed access to, and the security of, the canal after the transfer. National security experts agreed that without these treaties Panamanian forces, or terrorist groups, could easily attack the canal and disrupt its use. A large American military deployment would be needed to keep the canal open in an era of rising Panamanian nationalism. Ironically, the best way for the United States to protect and secure the canal was to turn it over to Panama.

The treaties, seen as necessary to experts, were never popular with the American people. In some polls, three-quarters of the public opposed the plans to transfer control of the canal to Panama. Conservatives organized grassroots opposition to the treaties, which Carter tried to counter by enlisting support from former presidents and giving a "fireside chat" to the American people. In Senate hearings, Secretary of State Vance claimed that the United States could unilaterally defend the canal, but Panama's chief treaty negotiator, Romulo Escobar, denied that the United States would have any right to intervene after the treaty was ratified. Senators Robert Byrd and Howard Baker then sponsored a bipartisan "leadership amendment," reiterating US rights to defend the canal.

Eventually the agreement passed the Senate, but only after additional amendments further reinforcing the right of the United States to intervene in Panama had been introduced by Senator Dennis DeConcini and accepted reluctantly by Panamanian president Omar Torrijos. Throughout the ratification process Carter worked tirelessly to convince senators in both parties to vote for the unpopular treaties. In the end, sixty-eight senators (one more than was needed) voted for ratification.

Thereafter Republicans would attack Carter for being "weak" and for "giving away" the Panama Canal, a theme that would play particularly well in the southern states in the midterm elections in 1978 and the presidential election in 1980. Carter and the Senate demonstrated great political courage in concluding the negotiations and resolving a long standing and controversial dispute with Panama.

Camp David Accords

The greatest foreign policy success of the Carter presidency involved the Middle East. After the Yom Kippur War of 1973 between Israel and its Arab enemies, Egypt and Syria, the Israelis had gradually disengaged their forces and moved a distance back in the Sinai Peninsula. They were still occupying Egyptian territory, however, and there was no peace between these adversaries.

In the fall of 1978, Carter invited Israel's Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egypt's President Anwar Sadat to sit down with him at Camp David, a rural presidential retreat outside Washington. Between September 5 and September 17, 1978, Carter shuttled between Israeli and Egyptian delegations, hammering out the terms of peace. Consequently, Begin and Sadat reached a historic agreement: Israel would withdraw from the entire Sinai Peninsula; the United States would establish monitoring posts to ensure that neither side attacked the other; Israel and Egypt would recognize each other's governments and sign a peace treaty; and Israel pledged to negotiate with the Palestinians for peace.

Not since Theodore Roosevelt's efforts to end the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 had a president so effectively mediated a dispute between two other nations. Begin made several concessions to Carter, including agreeing to the principle of Egyptian sovereignty over the entire Sinai, and complete Israeli withdrawal from all military facilities and settlements. In return, Carter agreed to provide Israel with funds to rebuild Israeli military bases in the Negev Desert. Sadat also made concessions to Carter, including postponement of negotiations on the core issues between Israel and the Palestinians. Sadat’s decisions alienated some of his own delegation and Arab leaders throughout the Middle East. Sadat’s prime minister resigned at the end of the negotiations, believing that Egypt had been outmaneuvered by the Americans and Israelis.

The Camp David Accords, initialed on September 17, 1978, and formally signed in Washington on March 26, 1979, were the most significant foreign policy achievement of the Carter administration, and supporters hoped it would revive his struggling presidency. Although Begin and Sadat received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1979 for their efforts, Carter received no significant political benefit from this achievement, and in fact, won fewer votes from Jewish Americans in 1980 than he did in 1976.

Relations with the Soviet Union

Carter hoped to continue the policy of détente with the Soviet Union, but his appointment to the National Security Council (NSC) post of Brzezinski gave him an adviser who was profoundly suspicious of Soviet motives and led Carter into several major confrontations with the Soviets. Carter ordered a massive five-year defense buildup that the Soviets found provocative. In turn, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 to quash a Muslim-based rebellion outraged the United States.

The guerrilla war that ensued put a crimp in arms control talks between Moscow and Washington. The two sides had signed SALT II, a treaty limiting the deployment of nuclear missiles, and the treaty had been sent to the Senate. After the invasion of Afghanistan, the Senate took no action. Carter withdrew the treaty, but Moscow and Washington agreed to abide by its terms, even though neither side ratified it.

In retaliation for the USSR invading Afghanistan, Carter cut off grain sales to the Soviet Union and ordered a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympic Games by US athletes. Because much of the public considered this to be more punitive towards American athletes than Soviet leaders, Carter's response reinforced his weak image.

Recognition of China

Carter continued to expand American contacts with communist China, granting the communist regime formal diplomatic recognition on January 1, 1979. To do so required the severing of diplomatic ties and withdrawal of recognition of non-communist Taiwan (also known as the Republic of China). Moreover, Carter unilaterally revoked the 1955 Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China, effective January 1, 1980.

Conservative Republicans challenged Carter's treaty abrogation in the federal courts. In the federal district court, his opponents won. However, in appeals court, the government's position that Carter had the power to revoke the treaty without Senate consent prevailed. The Supreme Court then threw the entire case out without rendering any decision (on a technicality involving the standing to sue of Republican Senator Barry Goldwater), thus leaving the constitutional victory with the president by default.

Carter's recognition of China significantly reduced tensions in East Asia. Hard-liners in China were replaced by communists who were more interested in economic growth than in military confrontations. China and the United States established beneficial trade relations, leading to huge imports of finished consumer goods from China, in return for US lumber and foodstuffs.

To substitute for formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act. It provided for the creation of an American Institute on Taiwan, which bought the old American embassy. Institute staffers consisted of newly retired American foreign service officers experienced in Far Eastern Affairs. Taiwan established a corresponding institute in Washington, DC, staffed with its retired diplomats. Thus, each side continued quasi-diplomatic relations. The United States continued to supply arms to Taiwan to defend itself from China, a step that kept some friction in US-Chinese relations.

The Iran Hostage Crisis

Iran had become important to the 20th century chessboard for two reasons. Oil had been discovered there in 1909, and it was considered the geographic cork that kept Russia in the Asian bottle and out of the Middle East. The British, through Anglo-Dutch Shell Oil, controlled Iranian oil through mid-century, but in 1951 a volatile new prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq, threw them out. The American government became concerned that Iran was now ripe for a Soviet takeover. The Central Intelligence Agency supported a coup that toppled the prime minister and restored power to the Pahlavi ruling dynasty, whose monarch at the time had been reduced to a figurehead under Mosaddeq. This leader, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, ("Shah" meaning "ruler") was allowed to govern once rights to 80 percent of the oil were transferred to American and British interests. This agreement made the Shah a Western puppet in the eyes of many Iranians.

The Shah, emboldened by American support over the years, became increasingly tyrannical towards his people. He outlawed rival political factions and deployed one of the world's most feared secret police agencies. This resulted in serious human rights violations. By the time of the Carter presidency, discontent with the Shah was widespread in Iran, and so was civil disorder.

The Shah's most virulent opposition was led by a radical Islamic group that wanted to create a government adhering more strictly to their faith's teachings. Their supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, had been in exile in Iraq and Paris for fifteen years. But by early 1979, the conservative Islamic movement had become so strong that the Shah was forced to flee Iran and turn over power to a new group of Western-oriented technocrats. The Ayatollah returned to his homeland soon afterward and was greeted by a million Iranians marching on the capital. He gradually emerged as Iran’s undisputed leader.

The Shah was now in exile in Mexico, dying from cancer, and President Carter allowed him to come to the United States for medical treatment. This move enraged Muslim fundamentalists in Iran. In November 1979, Islamic student militants loyal to the Ayatollah overran the American embassy in Teheran, Iran's capital. They seized sixty-six Americans and held them hostage, demanding that the Shah return to stand trial. In addition, they demanded money and property that the Shah had stashed outside Iran, and an apology from America, who they considered "The Great Satan."

Carter took immediate action. He froze billions of dollars of Iranian assets in the United States, then began secret negotiations, but nothing worked. The manner in which television network news reported on the crisis served to build up America's frustration. Mobs burned the American flag and shouted, "Marg bar Amerika" ("Death to America") on nightly television news broadcasts in Iran. These film clips were rebroadcast in the United States, creating feelings of apprehension for the hostages and anger at Iran. By counting the number of days that the hostages had been held in captivity, nightly announcements such as "America Held Hostage, Day Eighty-Nine" focused on the prolonged crisis. Americans grew impatient with the seemingly ineffective president who could not win the hostages' release. The Iranians heightened this political tension by making reasonable promises and then going back on them.

Finally, Carter approved a secret military mission to attempt to free the hostages. Unfortunately, three of the eight helicopters carrying the assault force developed mechanical problems. One crashed into a transport aircraft in a remote desert in Iran, killing eight soldiers. After the failure, Iran dispersed the hostages to hideouts throughout the country, making rescue impossible. The failure of the rescue mission doomed Carter politically. It seemed to reinforce the widespread notion that he could not get things done, and that America had lost its edge. His approval rating dropped, and when he was up for reelection, Republicans made a major issue of his performance in the crisis.

Though Reagan criticized Carter for his failures in Iran in 1980, there is growing evidence that members of his election team privately delivered messages to Iranian officials, urging them to hold the hostages until after the American election in November. The Reagan team wanted to avoid an “October surprise” that might have helped Carter win a second term.

After losing the 1980 presidential election, Carter concluded an agreement that led to the release of the hostages. His executive agreement with Iran specified that the United States would unblock all Iranian funds, and the United States and Iran would utilize a tribunal at The Hague, Netherlands, to settle their financial claims. The United States also promised not to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran. In return, Iran agreed to release the hostages. After the Iranians took over the US embassy, it subsequently became a training camp for the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, the most militant and most anti-American wing of the groups backing the Islamic regime.